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AUTONOMY PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS FOR-PROFITS: FORESEEABLE
CONSEQUENCES
INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2017, recently elected President Trump released the “Presidential Executive
Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty” (“Executive Order”).1 The Executive Order
announced a broad commitment to religious freedom, claiming that its policy will protect religious
liberty the way the founders intended.2 The Executive Order also instructed Attorney General, at
that time Jeff Sessions (“Attorney General”), to issue guidance to all executive departments and
agencies interpreting these expanded ideals of religious liberty protections.3
On October 6, 2017, the Attorney General released a memorandum (“AG’s Memo”) to all
of the executive departments and agencies in response to the Executive Order.4 The AG’s Memo
set forth twenty principles to aid all of the executive departments and agencies to carry out
President Trump’s mission to a broadened commitment to religious freedom.5 The AG’s Memo
recognized religion as a fundamental liberty that extends to churches, persons, and businesses.6
The AG’s Memo further recognized the demanding strict scrutiny standard in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 7 and that it is applicable to individuals, nonprofit
organizations, and even some for-profit corporations.8 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
RFRA was interpreted broadly; it deferred to the religious claimant’s definition of burdensome

1

Exec. Order No. 13798 § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order].
Id.
3
Id.
4
Memorandum from Jeffrey Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Law Protections for Religious
Liberty (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001891/download [hereinafter
Memorandum].
5
Id. at 1.
6
Id. at 2.
7
Id. at 3; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
8
See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
2

2

regulations, thus extending RFRA to apply to at least some for-profit businesses.9 The AG’s Memo
also acknowledges that the government may not interfere with the autonomy of a religious
organization and that religious employers are entitled to make employment decisions in
accordance with their religious tenets.10
The Executive Order and AG’s Memo lead us to the topic of this paper. On August 15,
2019, the Federal Register (The Daily Journal of the United States Government) published a notice
of newly proposed regulations. 11 The United States Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) proposed regulations (“DOL Regulations”) to
clarify the scope of the religious exemptions under section 204(c) of Executive Order 11246. 12
Before discussing the DOL Regulations, it is important to note that in 2014 President Obama
signed off on Executive Order 13672, amending Executive Order 11246 to include protections for
employees of federal contractors on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.13 In
contrast, the DOL Regulations will allow federal contractors with religious beliefs to make
employment decisions on the basis of those beliefs without losing their eligibility to be a federal
contractor, which undoubtedly impacts President Obama’s Executive Order 13627.14 In clarifying
the scope of the religious exemptions, the DOL Regulations seek to add definitions to the following

9

See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
11
See generally Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption,
84 Fed. Reg. 41677 (proposed Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 CFR 60) [hereinafter Implementing Legal
Requirements].
12
Id. (One year after President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he signed Executive Order 11246. This
order required equal employment opportunities in federal government contracting. Two years later, President
Johnson expanded Executive Order 11246 to coincide with Title VII in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex
and religion. Around a decade later, the authority to enforce Executive Order 11246 was integrated into the DOL.
Following that, in 2002, President Bush amended Executive Order 11246 to include Title VII’s exemptions for
religious organizations).
13
See generally 41 CFR 60 (2014).
14
See generally Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11.
10
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terms: Religion; Particular Religion; Religious corporation, association, educational institution,
or society; Exercise of Religion; and Sincere.15
These newly defined terms would provide broad religious exemptions to for-profit
institutions that are federal contractors.16 In articulating the DOL Regulations, the OFCCP,
prompted by the administration’s mandate under the Executive Order and AG’s Memo, drew
further influence from Title VII case law and recently decided United States Supreme Court cases
as reminders of the federal government’s duty to protect the freedom of religion. 17 When
interpreting these regulations, one could pose two questions: 1. Are the DOL Regulations a
necessary implication of Hobby Lobby? And 2. Are the DOL Regulations extending the autonomy
doctrine, normally applied to churches and nonprofits to protect their internal operations from
government intrusion, to for-profit organizations?
If our analysis concludes that the DOL Regulations are a necessary implication of Hobby
Lobby, that means that the DOL is merely establishing a strict scrutiny standard at the executive
level extending to religious for-profits.18 However, if we reject that contention and instead
conclude that the DOL Regulations are an extension of the autonomy doctrine, normally applied
to churches and nonprofits, we have a much more problematic conclusion. 19 And this problematic
conclusion is the correct conclusion. The DOL Regulations are not a necessary implication of
Hobby Lobby. Rather, the DOL Regulations are an extension of the autonomy doctrine to for-profit
institutions. If a business claims it is operated according to religious principles, then its

15

Id. at 41679.
Id.
17
Id. at 41678.
18
See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1
(1993).
19
See generally Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981) (Summarizing the significance of
applying the autonomy doctrine to churches and nonprofits).
16
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employment decisions might be unreviewable under such a doctrine. Therefore, the DOL
Regulations should be withdrawn because 1. They will dilute the autonomy doctrine as applied to
churches and nonprofits, 2. They will harm members of the LGBTQ, women, and minority groups
in the workforce, 3. This religious autonomy could extend to non-religious moral claims and even
larger businesses, and 4. There is value in having a diversified workplace.
This paper will proceed as follows: Part I addresses the impact that the Hobby Lobby
decision has had on businesses, as well as the recently adopted Religious Exemption and Moral
Exemption for certain businesses.20 This part further addresses the role RFRA plays in these
particular contexts. Part II explores the autonomy doctrine by providing examples of case law on
how, in particular, the ministerial exception and Title VII exemption are distinct, yet relate to the
common protection of institutional autonomy for churches and nonprofits. Part III examines the
DOL Regulations and explores their potential real-life application. This part further demonstrates
that these regulations are not an implication of Hobby Lobby, but rather, expanding institutional
autonomy to for-profits. Part IV then assesses that the DOL Regulations should be withdrawn
because the rules are, in fact, autonomous protections to for-profits. This part further analyzes how
the reasoning for withdrawing the DOL Regulations is to avoid diluting the autonomy doctrine, to
prevent harm to certain individuals of our society, to avoid the potential expansion of religious
autonomy to non-religious moral claims and larger businesses, and the implications of future
morals clauses in for-profit employer’s employment contracts with employees. Furthermore, this
part looks at the valuable policy of having a diversified workplace.

20

See infra note 29; see also infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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I.

The Impact on Businesses Following Hobby Lobby and the Religious Exemption
and Moral Exemption to Contraceptive Coverage Under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
In 2014, the United States Supreme Court held in Hobby Lobby that RFRA applies to

regulatory actions of closely held for-profit corporations.21 This holding is derived from a
challenge to regulations promulgated under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), through the
guidance of the Obama administration. 22 Under these regulations, employer-provided health
insurance plans were required to provide particular preventative services which included any
contraceptive coverage approved by the Food and Drug Administration.23 Plaintiffs, who were
owners of closely held for-profits, successfully challenged this contraceptive coverage mandate,
arguing that it was a violation of RFRA. 24 Hobby Lobby argued that the Health and Human
Services’ (“HHS”) contraceptive mandate substantially burdened Hobby Lobby’s religious
beliefs.25 The Court stated that if the HHS contraceptive mandate was to survive a RFRA challenge
and overcome Hobby Lobby’s substantial burden, a compelling government interest needed to be
shown that HHS’ mandate was the least restrictive alternative to requiring that certain closely held
for-profits provide contraceptive coverage. 26 The Court concluded, limiting the holding to the
facts, that the HHS mandate requiring employers to provide contraceptives violated RFRA in
substantially burdening Hobby Lobby’s free exercise of religion.27

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 683; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993) (The purposes of RFRA are “(1) to
restore the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to
provide a claim of defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the government”).
22
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 701.
25
Id. at 686.
26
Id. at 726.
27
Id. at 686-687.
21
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On November 15, 2018, the Federal Register published two new final rules from HHS, the
Department of the Treasury, and the DOL for Religious Exemption and Moral Exemption from
providing coverage of certain preventative services under the ACA, such as contraceptive
coverage.28 The first rule, the Religious Exemption, provides that entities that have a sincerely held
religious belief against providing contraceptive coverage are exempt from the original ACA
mandate requiring them to provide such coverage. 29 Entities that fell under this rule included
churches, nonprofits, and for-profit entities that are both not publicly traded and publicly traded. 30
The second rule, the Moral Exemption, provides that certain entities that have non-religious moral
convictions against providing contraceptive coverage may also exempt themselves from the ACA
mandate requiring them to provide such coverage. 31 Entities that fell under this rule included
nonprofits and for-profit entities that are not publicly traded. 32 Although both rules allow the
original ACA contraceptive accommodation to be available through the entity’s insurer or a third
party administrator, that option is left entirely to the entity.33 Both of these rules were enacted in
light of RFRA and were articulated by the Trump administration as the appropriate response to the
substantial burden the Court found in Hobby Lobby.34

28

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Fact Sheet: Final Rules on Religious and Moral Exemptions and
Accommodation for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act (Nov.7, 2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/11/07/fact-sheet-final-rules-on-religious-and-moral-exemptions-andaccommodation-for-coverage-of-certain-preventive-services-under-affordable-care-act.html [hereinafter U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, Fact Sheet].
29
45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); see also Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57592 at 57545 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 45
C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018) [hereinafter Religious Exemption].
30
Id.
31
45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018); see also Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57592 at 57604 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §
147.133 (2018) (Defining “moral convictions” based from Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), as those:
“(1) that the individual ‘deeply and sincerely holds’; (2) ‘that are purely ethical and moral in source and content’; (3)
‘but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty’; (4) and that ‘certainly occupy in the life of that individual a place
parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious persons,’ such that one could say ‘his beliefs function as a
religion in his life’”) [hereinafter Moral Exemption].
32
45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018).
33
See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Fact Sheet, supra note 28.
34
See Religious Exemption, supra note 29.
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II.

The Autonomy Doctrine

The autonomy doctrine, also known as the “church autonomy doctrine,” “church autonomy
principle,” and the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,” is derived from the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 35 An essential theme of the autonomy
doctrine is to protect churches and nonprofits from secular judicial interference in religious
matters, particularly in the area of employment.36 Courts will defer to churches in their
relationships with clergy and other employees in ways not available to secular employers.37 For
instance, sometimes employees of churches and nonprofits are required to accept a morals clause
in their employment agreements with their employer.38 These clauses can seek to regulate the
conduct of an employee based on an employer’s religion, ethics, or morals.39 Religious employers
can seek to regulate not only an employee’s professional life, but an employee’s personal life as
well, because of the protection of church autonomy.40
Other times, employees find themselves fired or demoted based on what they feel is
discriminatory. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., the
Court recognized the ministerial exception and found that interfering with a church’s decision to
hire or fire a minister infringed on that church’s internal governance violating the Free Exercise
Clause.41 Furthermore, the Court found that granting the state the power to determine which

35

See Mitchell Waldman, J.D., III. Jurisdiction of Courts; Prohibition Against Court Interference with Internal
Affairs, 45 FLA. JUR. 2d Religious Societies § 11 (Sept. 2019 Update).
36
Id.
37
See Angela C. Carmella, After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious For-Profit” And The Limits Of The Autonomy
Doctrine, 80 MO. L. REV. 381, 399-402 (2015).
38
See Josh Scharff, Morals Clauses: What They Mean For Employees Of Religious Institutions, Peer Gan & Gisler,
LLP, (Jul. 31, 2014), http://peerganlaw.com/morals-clauses-what-they-mean-for-employees-of-religious-institutions/
(Summarizing what a “morals clause” within an employment contract is and the impacts that these provisions have
had).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
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individuals will be ministers to a given faith violates the Establishment Clause by involving the
government in ecclesiastical decisions and that this authority should be left to the church itself. 42
The Court noted Hosanna-Tabor’s holding was limited in that the ministerial exception bars a
minister’s employment discrimination lawsuit in an attempt to legally challenge their church’s
decision to terminate them. 43 However, the term minister has been broadly interpreted by courts
covering various occupations throughout a religious organization. 44 In essence, employees that are
considered ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception are legally precluded from bringing
any employment discrimination suit based on sex, race, pregnancy, national origin, and all other
legally protected classes.45
In addition to the ministerial exception, Title VII provides an exemption for religious
organizations under section 702.46 Under this exemption, a religious employer can make decisions
that discriminate on the basis of religion regardless of whether the nature of the employment was
religious or secular, providing no legal remedy for employees under religious discrimination
doctrine.47 In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, plaintiff’s Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit against their religious employer for
terminating them after the plaintiffs failed to qualify as church members was unsuccessful due to
section 702.48 The Court held that applying section 702’s exemption to secular nonprofit activities

42

Id. at 188-189.
Id. at 196 (The Court declined to rule whether the ministerial exception would bar any other kind of employment
action, such as a breach of contract or tort action).
44
See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012) (Barring a former music director’s
employment discrimination lawsuit under the ministerial exception); see also Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York,
863 F.3d 190 (2nd Cir. 2017) (Barring a former principal’s employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit under
the ministerial exception).
45
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171; see also Carmella, supra note 37, at 400.
46
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1.
47
Id.; see also Carmella, supra note 37, at 402.
48
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
43
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of a religious organization did not violate the Establishment Clause. 49 Obviously grounded in the
autonomy doctrine, the exemption gives a religious organization freedom to “define and carry out
their [own] religious missions” without governmental interference. 50 The Amos decision displays
the broad deference a church receives when it seeks to keep only its own members as employees,
even for secular activities.51 In considering this, also note that the exemption has been interpreted
to include employees bound by morals clauses.52 Such employees, regardless of faith, are required
to comply with church teachings.
Although there are undoubtedly notable distinctions between the ministerial exception and
the Title VII exemption, both clearly relate to the common protection of institutional autonomy. 53
Grounded in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the autonomy doctrine means that
religious organizations have an interest in governing their own internal affairs such as selecting
their own leaders, defining their own doctrines, and running their institutions, without interference
from a secular court. 54 As previously discussed, the autonomy doctrine has gone as far as
demonstrating that religious organizations should be protected from religious employment
discrimination lawsuits so long as the organization’s allegedly discriminatory conduct is for the
institution’s own religious mission.55 The autonomy doctrine, constitutionalized in Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, has had and continues to have
recognized progeny since its inception in the early 1950’s.56 The autonomy doctrine, as embedded

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991) (A non-Catholic teacher brought a Title VII lawsuit against her
former employer, a Catholic School, for failing to renew her contract because of her remarriage. The Court held that
Title VII did not apply to the school’s decision to not rehire her.).
53
See Carmella supra note 37, at 399-404.
54
Amos, 483 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also, Laycock, supra note 19, at 1389.
55
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
56
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); see also
Laycock, supra note 19, at 1395.
50
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in both Title VII’s religious employer exemption and in the ministerial exception, has always
applied to churches and nonprofit organizations, rather than for-profits.57 The idea was that
nonprofit institutions have a colorable claim that its operations will not be secular in nature and
that any earnings the institution makes will finance the continued purpose of the institution, as
opposed to a for-profit distributing earnings to its owners.58
III.

The Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs’
Proposed Regulations Definitions

The DOL Regulation’s purpose is to extend religious liberty to any federal contractor who
wishes to exercise such liberty. 59 This purpose is in clear accordance with the Executive Order and
the AG’s Memo.60 The DOL Regulations accord with the Executive Order and the AG’s Memo is
evident because each document highlights religion with paramount importance and makes clear
that religious exercise deserves the utmost protection.61 Each of these documents also expressly
state that this religious protection applies not only to individuals, but to organizations as well. 62
What the DOL Regulations will do, in effect, is allow federal contractors to hold themselves out
to the public as a religious employer and allow them to make any of their employment decisions
in adherence to their alleged religious purpose.63 The Federal Register expressly states that the
DOL Regulation’s intention is to make clear that Executive Order 11246 does not apply to just
churches, but employers with federal contracts as well. 64 The way the DOL accomplishes this is

57

See generally Laycock, supra note 19.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59
See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679.
60
See generally Exec. Order supra note 1; see also Memorandum, supra note 4.
61
See Exec. Order, supra note 1, see generally Memorandum, supra note 4, see generally Implementing Legal
Requirements, supra note 11.
62
See Exec. Order supra note 1, see generally Memorandum supra note 4, see generally Implementing Legal
Requirements supra note 11.
63
See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679.
64
Id.
58
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by expanding the definitions of certain terms, as noted above. 65 The DOL Regulations broad
definition of Religion will allow all exercises of religion to fall within protection. 66 A potential
issue in defining Religion so broadly, as this paper will discuss, is how broadly defined will all
exercises of religion be? Such a broadly defined term begs the question of whether these
regulations implicate, not only strictly “religious” practices, but moral convictions as well. By
defining Particular religion so broadly, any hiring or firing decision by the employer can be based
on that employer’s own religion.67 This expansive definition leads to the potential morals clauses
that could be drafted in future, or amended, employment contracts. 68 By defining Religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society so broadly, closely held for-profit
corporations fall within the protection of these regulations. 69 This paper contemplates if the DOL
Regulations could ever be interpreted broadly enough to encompass larger businesses, such as forprofit publicly traded companies, which were included in the Religious Exemption for
contraceptive insurance coverage. 70 Looking at the definitions of Exercise of religion and Sincere
together, if a for-profit’s employment-based actions were merely driven by the owner’s personal
religious beliefs then that conduct falls within the protection of the DOL Regulations as well.71

65

See supra Introduction.
See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679 (The OFCCP defines Religion as including, but
not limiting to, all aspects of religious beliefs, observance, and practice).
67
See id. (The OFCCP defines Particular religion as allowing “religious contractors not only to prefer in
employment individuals who share their religion, but also to condition employment on acceptance of or adherence to
religious tenets as understood by the employing contractor”).
68
See Scharff, supra note 38.
69
See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41681-41683 (The OFCCP defines Religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society by modifying the test set out in, Spencer v. World
Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011), where (1) “the contractor must be organized for a religious purpose,
meaning that it was conceived with a self-identified religious purpose. This need not be the contractor’s only
purpose[,]” (2) “the contractor must hold itself out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose[,] . . . measured
with reference to the particular religion identified by the contractor[,]” and (3) “the contractor must exercise religion
consistent with, and in furtherance of, a religious purpose.” It is important to note that the OFCCP left out the fourth
factor of the test that “the entity seeking exemption ‘not engage primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods
or services for money beyond nominal amounts.’”).
70
See id. and accompanying text; see also Religious Exemption, supra note 29.
71
See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41684-41685. (internal citations omitted) (The OFCCP
used the definition for Exercise of religion from RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
66
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The proposed definition of Sincere could make one contemplate if these religious missions will
blend in moral precepts as well.72 The OFCCP has also proposed a but-for standard of causation
in evaluating discrimination claims which will require the OFCCP to find a violation of Executive
Order 11246 only if it can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a protected class,
other than religion, was the but-for cause of the discrimination claim. 73
This brings us to our two original questions posed: 1. Are the DOL Regulations a necessary
implication of Hobby Lobby? And 2. Are the DOL Regulations extending the autonomy doctrine
to for-profit organizations?
A. The Department of Labor Regulations are Not a Necessary Implication of
Hobby Lobby and the RFRA Progeny
What Hobby Lobby and the recently adopted Religious Exemption and Moral Exemption
rules clearly relate to is an institution’s choice on whether or not to provide contraceptive insurance
coverage.74 In contrast to the autonomy doctrine, which recognizes the autonomous decision
making of certain topics within an institution, Hobby Lobby and the contraceptive regulations came
to fruition through RFRA adjudication and differ because a substantial burden on religion needs
to be shown in such context. 75 It may be argued that the DOL Regulations are a necessary
implication of Hobby Lobby because the Court, in that decision, did not differentiate between
nonprofits and for-profits in the exercise of religion.76 Thus, the argument would be that since

Act defining it as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
The OFCCP went further stating that the Exercise of religion must be sincere, defining Sincere as “. . . whether a
sincerely held religious belief actually motivated the institutions actions.”).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); see also 45
C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018).
75
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993); see also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018);
see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018).
76
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682.
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nonprofits and for-profits are treated as persons, both types of entities should be given the same
treatment with respect to religious liberty. 77 The OFCCP even cites Hobby Lobby, among other
cases, in support of the DOL Regulations.78
However, as previously mentioned, Hobby Lobby applied a strict scrutiny standard of
review to determine whether a for-profit was substantially burdened by the contraceptive
requirement.79 The government needed to show a compelling interest that the HHS’ mandate
requiring certain closely held for-profits to provide contraceptive coverage was the least restrictive
alternative.80 In ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby, majority opinion author, Justice Alito, articulated
that the Court’s decision only covered the contraceptive mandate, meaning that it did not apply to
all insurance-coverage mandates. 81 Furthermore, Justice Alito explicitly narrowed the Hobby
Lobby holding to the facts, stating that the decision would not be treated as a shield for employers
to discriminate on the basis of religion. 82
The DOL Regulations are not driven by Hobby Lobby, or RFRA, in general. The DOL
Regulations make no mention that they are applying a strict scrutiny standard or that even a
substantial burden must be established. Perhaps it could be, and has already been, argued that the
implications of Hobby Lobby would begin a slippery slope of discriminatory employment-based

77

Id. at 684 (The Court suggested that there was no Congressional intent that RFRA departed from the Dictionary
Act, which does not differentiate between “persons” from “corporations”).
78
See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679 (The OFCCP also cites to Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018) (Holding that a commission’s hostility towards an
individual’s religious views violates the Free Exercise Clause), Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (Holding that a government agency denying a church an otherwise available public benefit
because of their religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause), and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (Holding that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause bar a minister’s employment discrimination lawsuit against their church) in support of these regulations as
well).
79
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691-692.
80
Id. at 726.
81
Id. at 686.
82
Id.
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decisions protected by for-profit institutions’ religious liberties.83 But as will be discussed,
institutional autonomy protections are much different, requiring no burden to be established for
decisions solely pursuing religious missions.84
B. The Department of Labor Regulations are an Extension of the Autonomy
Doctrine to For-Profit Institutions
The DOL Regulations are a way of extending the autonomy doctrine. The autonomy
doctrine, as previously mentioned, has allowed churches and nonprofits to internally govern their
institutions in the ways they see fit, as well as being allowed to discriminate on the basis of religion
in the employment process because
[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere
aggregation of individuals. Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of
an organization’s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission
should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community defines itself.
Solicitude for a church’s ability to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the
autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as
well.85
The DOL Regulations are, in effect, allowing for-profits to conduct themselves in the same
manner that churches and nonprofits do through institutional autonomy. Examining the definition
of Particular religion,86 if an employee chose not to adhere to the religion of a business or chose
to behave in a way that is unacceptable to that business because of its broadly defined religion,

83

See generally Hannah Martin, Note, Race, Religion, and RFRA: The Implications Of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. In Employment Discrimination, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO (2016) (Arguing that the Hobby Lobby
decision has race discrimination implications to its holding and an employer can easily hide this racial
discrimination under a federal or a state RFRA statute).
84
See generally Laycock, supra note 19.
85
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
86
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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that employee may be terminated from their job. From this broader scenario, we can draw up a
real-life hypothetical where an LGBTQ worker, who is married to an individual of the same sex,
has been an apprentice for a federal contracting for-profit business for several months. If the DOL
Regulations go into effect and the owner of that company decides to announce that they have a
sincere belief that all employees must adhere to the tenets of the owner’s exercise of religion 87
which does not sincerely88 believe in same sex marriage, the DOL Regulations would allow that
company to terminate that employee for not adhering to the owner’s religion.
In examining such a hypothetical, we can draw the conclusion that the DOL Regulations
are an extension of the autonomy doctrine. The DOL Regulations do not flow from a balancing
analysis like we would see in the RFRA context. Religious employers need not demonstrate any
burden. Rather, the DOL Regulations would allow for-profits, like churches and nonprofits, to
govern their institutions in ways they see fit, so long as they have a sincere religious belief. Harms
that could arise from extending the autonomy doctrine to for-profits have dire consequences for
the doctrine itself and certain groups of people. Thus, we will now examine the various
consequences that may arise from extending autonomy-based protections.
IV.

The Department of Labor Regulations Should be Withdrawn Because they are
an Extension of the Autonomy Doctrine

We must lastly ask ourselves: Should the autonomy doctrine be extended to for-profit
institutions by virtue of the DOL Regulations? We must answer that question in the negative. The
autonomy doctrine should not be extended to for-profit institutions and the DOL Regulations
should be withdrawn because: 1. They will dilute the autonomy doctrine as applied to churches
and nonprofits, 2. They will harm members of the LGBTQ, women, and minority groups in the
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workforce, 3. This religious autonomy could extend to non-religious moral claims and even larger
businesses, and 4. There is valuable policy in aspiring to have a diversified workplace.
A. The Department of Labor Regulations Will Dilute the Autonomy Doctrine
It can be observed that if we begin to view for-profits similarly as we do churches and
nonprofits, with respect to religious liberty, we will be systemically placing for-profits on the same
pedestal as we do churches and nonprofits. First, we should look to the long history of respecting
and protecting the boundaries of separation of church and state which stems from the founding of
our nation.89 Addressing the history of separating church and state demonstrates the importance of
why we have the church autonomy doctrine. In adopting the First Amendment with its respective
Religion Clauses, the founders wanted to ensure that, unlike the Church of England at that time,
the government would not have a role in filling ecclesiastical positions and offices.90 A driving
purpose for this was to refrain from having a national church forcefully project its religious views
onto its own citizens by allowing the federal government to choose who its ministers will be. 91
Following the principles of the Religion Clauses, the Establishment Clause was to prevent the
government from appointing ministers, while the Free Exercise Clause was to prevent the
government from interfering with a church’s decision to select their own ministers. 92 Title VII’s
religious exemption, also based on church autonomy, further allows the hiring of co-religionists
and those who will support the mission via a morals clause for any job, free from any religious
discrimination concern. 93 The value in allowing church autonomy and this idea of separation of
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church and state was only reaffirmed in subsequent United States Supreme Court cases.94 The
significance in protecting the sanctity of a churches’ and nonprofits’ right to govern their own
internal affairs is displayed even more so when these organizations seek to further their religious
mission by participating in activities such as building churches and schools, educating children,
and teaching moral values. 95 By participating in such activities, individuals within that religious
community get a robust sense of being apart of an even larger community. 96 “Such a community
represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere
aggregation of individuals”97 and church autonomy deems it vital that such religious activities only
be performed by members of that religious community. 98 It is vital because not only are these
institutions achieving their religious purpose, but they are also able to provide an example of their
way of life to others.99 Seemingly, autonomy-based protections are not only important to larger
religious communities as a whole, but also to individuals who already belong to them or those who
would like to join them.100
A church’s and nonprofit’s purpose for espousing their religious views onto others and
requiring others in their institutions to adopt such views may been seen in contrast to a for-profit’s
main purpose of financial gain and subsequently redistributing the profits.101 This distinction
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demonstrates the dangers of expanding the doctrine and diluting its core purpose.102 The way that
the doctrine becomes diluted is that essentially we are equating each type of institutions primary
purpose and saying that these messages deserve the same amount of protection, namely, autonomy.
When we parallel these missions and allow these equivalent protections, that means these
protections can just as easily be taken away from nonprofit institutions compared to for-profit
institutions.103
Another way that the autonomy doctrine could become eroded by allowing for-profits such
protection is that, in the case of a church or nonprofit, it is fairly clear to see what the institution’s
religious mission is.104 The mission is displayed by how these institutions take advantage of their
granted autonomy protections, for example, a church only allowing ministers of a particular faith
to preach at their institution. 105 However, in the for-profit context, it may not be so clear what the
exact message of the institution is when, on one hand, the message could very well be to further
their religious mission, while on the other hand, the mission could be to make a profit. 106 For
example, if a for-profit company had a boss that did not follow the company’s alleged religion but
that boss brought in much business, that company would be very inclined to keep that boss, and
perhaps would. One could only imagine more examples of how this doctrine becomes eroded by
granting nonprofits and churches the same autonomy-based protections as entities whose primary
purpose is to make money. Furthermore, for-profits are obviously economic actors that are central
to our society.107 Individuals often seek to these institutions just to make a living which is also in
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contrast to what can be said about churches and nonprofits.108 However, it is important to
acknowledge that some businesses can have a religious belief where the owners may seek to fulfill
a religious mission.109 But the fact that for-profits participate in the market means that their
religious mission will be of a different nature than a church or nonprofit which is exclusively
created for that mission.110
B. The Department of Labor Regulations Will be Harmful to Members of the
LGBTQ, Women, and Minority Groups in the Workforce
The DOL Regulations will be unquestionably harmful to members of the LGBTQ, women,
and minority groups. Although the DOL Regulations expressly address an employer’s continuing
obligation not to discriminate based on protected classes other than religion, the DOL Regulations
ensure that conscience and religious liberty will be given the broadest protection. 111 Consequently,
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) has urged the DOL to withdraw the DOL Regulations,
arguing that the DOL Regulations will make it much more difficult for employees to prove
employment discrimination on the basis of a protected class other than religion. 112 One difficulty
for proving discrimination of a protected class that the ABA has cited is the new “but-for” standard
that the DOL Regulations propose, as explained in Part III above.113 This standard will be
undoubtedly difficult to meet in trying to prove that an employer’s grounds for termination based
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on religion was merely a pretext for discrimination based on another protected class. In opposing
the adoption of the DOL Regulations, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has also
acknowledged the challenges that members of the LGBTQ and unmarried pregnant women would
face.114 An indication that the DOL Regulations will harm LGBT members and workers is the fact
that the proposed rule cites to Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, a case
where a bakery owner denied baking a cake for a gay couple, without providing any protections
for sexual orientation. 115 For example, an employer would be able to terminate an employee on
the basis of religion for merely being homosexual. The former employee would argue that religion
was merely a pretext and that they were fired because of their sexual orientation. However, the
employer could easily counter, citing that their sincere religious beliefs are only in heterosexuality.
Since this belief is sincere, it is likely that the employer’s argument would succeed because as an
autonomy protection, it does not matter whether the person is fired because they are a bad
employee or because they are gay. Autonomy protection means the court defers regardless of the
employer’s decision.116 It is also important to note that because it is difficult to question sincerity,
this also allows anti-gay businesses to claim religious exemption even if they are not actually
religious. While the DOL Regulations seem to require at least some showing of a sincere religious
belief – that is to put it on the same footing as a church and religious nonprofit – that is the same
as giving for-profits autonomy.117
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The DOL Regulations would work in the same manner against women who are unmarried
and pregnant as well as people who are nonreligious.118 Patricia Shiu (“Shiu”), former Director of
the OFCCP under President Obama and now an advisor for the Berkeley Center on Comparative
Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law, cautioned that the implementation of the DOL Regulations
would “gut” anti-discrimination laws.119 Although the DOL reasons that religion can not be used
as an excuse to discriminate against other protected classes, Shiu warns that these regulations have
the potential to go as far as creating a “loophole” for employers and institutions to discriminate
against anyone.120 Shiu provided an extreme loophole example where she believes that if an
employer argued that their religion dictates that women cannot work outside of the home, the
religious exemption would be justified to not hire women. 121
Another group of individuals the DOL Regulations would negatively impact are minorities.
In this context, a religious nonprofit, that has a federal government contract, could refuse to hire
those who are Muslim or Jewish or who refuse to sign a morals contract because the employer
only adheres to Catholicism.122 Under the DOL Regulations, this also seems to be an acceptable
form of religious discrimination. 123
As mentioned earlier, it is important to consider President Obama’s signing off of
Executive Order 13672, amending Executive Order 11246, to include protections for employees
of federal contractors on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. 124 The DOL
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Regulations will lead to a systematic weakening of President Obama’s Executive Order. 125 A poll
released in late 2017 by NPR, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and the Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health found that at least 20% LGBTQ people experienced discrimination when
applying for employment because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 126 This statistic
rose to 32% with respect to LGBTQ people of color.127 Looking at these numbers and considering
the implications of the DOL Regulations, it becomes apparent that these numbers will only
increase if the DOL Regulations are enacted. And not only will these numbers increase but the
employer will now be able to defend themselves from a discrimination lawsuit with a seemingly
impenetrable shield.
i.

The “Morals Clause Issue” in Employment Contracts with Current and
Future Employees who are LGBTQ Members, Women, and Minorities

When we further consider morals clauses that are part of many church and religious
nonprofit employment agreements, this issue becomes worse.128 If the DOL Regulations are
enacted, that could lead to many for-profit employers forcing their future employees, or trying to
amend with their current employees, employment contracts that have morals clauses to conform
the employee’s conduct inside and outside of the workplace with the religious tenets of the
employer. For example, a religious employer of a for-profit may be able to get any worker to agree
to not engage in sexual activity and/or get pregnant out of wedlock. While this may seem like a
pretext for sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination, under the DOL Regulations, this
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seems completely reasonable on the end of the employer who is just abiding to the doctrine of their
religious beliefs.
In 2014, in Catholic schools across the United States, it was seen that teachers were being
required to agree to morality clauses forbidding conduct such as using birth control and marrying
a member of the same sex. 129 An example from where this took place was in Oakland, California,
at Bishop O’Dowd High School.130 Teachers at this Catholic School were required to sign new
contracts that included morality clauses.131 A mother of students at this school viewed the teachers’
new employment contracts online, including the morality clauses, and became worrisome of
language that required teachers to follow the Catholic doctrine, not only in the classroom, but in
their personal lives too.132
The reality that these morals clause agreements have been a prerequisite requirement in the
nonprofit sector further exacerbates the negative impact that the DOL Regulations will have on
LGBTQ workers, women, and minority groups in the for-profit sector. In a world where one in
five LGBTQ workers felt that they were discriminated against when applying for employment
based on sexual orientation or gender identity, 133 it is difficult to imagine that there will not be
morals clauses drafted that are, at least, subtly discriminatory. However, even if these morals
clauses are drafted in such a manner, the pretext of a religious conviction will trump the alleged
discrimination, and the employer’s morals clause provision will have to be adhered to.
C. The Department of Labor Regulations Could Extend Religious Autonomy to
Moral Autonomy and Larger Businesses
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Earlier it was discussed that following the Hobby Lobby decision the Trump administration
established both a Religious Exemption and a Moral Exemption for businesses that object to
providing contraceptive coverage. 134 Although this paper argues that the Hobby Lobby decision is
not a necessary implication of the DOL Regulations, it could be argued that adopting the DOL
Regulations could lead to a parallel situation in how the Religious Exemption and Moral
Exemption for contraceptive coverage were adopted. Hobby Lobby, as discussed, was a religious
exemption case and then years later the Trump administration adopted the Religious Exemption
and Moral Exemption.135 This part of the argument contemplates that the DOL Regulations
actually regulate only what they explicitly say they will regulate, namely, religion. The argument
here is that: Following the adoption of the DOL Regulations, could years later the DOL
Regulations be expanded more broadly to include moral autonomy-based protections? I propose
that this is a foreseeable consequence from the context just discussed. For example, if the DOL
Regulations are enacted and President Trump is reelected, it is possible that his administration
could broaden the DOL Regulations even further to include moral autonomy. The administration
could accomplish this by expanding on the definitions from the DOL Regulations to include the
“moral conviction” test, based from Welsh and utilized in the Moral Exemption, which parallels
the protections provided to sincere religious beliefs with sincere ethical and moral beliefs.136
This potential slippery slope of expanding to autonomy on a religious and moral level
would lead to further dilution of the doctrine and even further harm for certain individuals of our
society. For example, if an employee was homosexual and an employer cited to some “moral
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conviction,” as opposed to citing to a sincere religious belief against homosexuals, that would be
enough for the employer to terminate that employee. Just from this simple example, one could
draw up thousands of potential scenarios that could occur because of the implications of the DOL
Regulations. This would also make the new “but-for” standard even more difficult to meet by
essentially conflating religious discrimination decisions with moral claims by the employer.
Additionally, the Religious Exemption for contraceptive coverage includes for-profits that
are publicly traded.137 In arguing that the Religious Exemption and Moral Exemption enactment
could parallel the DOL Regulations, that potentially means that religious autonomy-based
protections could expand to businesses larger than for-profit closely held companies. This
argument comes to fruition even more so when we look at the definition of Religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society and further analyze that the drafters of the DOL
Regulations left out the fourth factor of the Ninth Circuit World Vision test which states that an
entity looking for a Title VII religious exemption may not substantially engage in money
transactions for goods and services beyond nominal amounts.138 This is markedly different from
the DOL Regulations which evidently allows businesses to be involved in money transactions with
no “nominal” cap, an ability to earn a profit, and still qualify as a religious entity. 139
The consequences of enacting of the DOL Regulations could expand the autonomy
doctrine further than we had ever realized leading to irreparable harm. The potential positive
changes it could do for legitimate religious for-profits does not outweigh the extraordinary harm
that would be done if the DOL Regulations are passed.
D. It is Beneficial Policy to Aspire to Have Diversity in the Workplace
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Reasons for having diversity in the workplace go beyond political correctness.140 Diversity
in the workplace helps companies compete with other companies around the world that are already
encouraging diversity.141 For example, if an employer wants to engage in business in a country
that is overseas, like many other businesses already do, having an employee who understands that
country’s language and culture, may be best to handle or at least consult on that particular work
assignment. Encouraging a diversified employment environment can lead to less turnover because
all employees will feel valued and the employer has the chance to engage in ideas with employees
from all walks of life. 142 A diversified workplace can also lead to the employer increasing
flexibility by recognizing the differences between people from different cultures. 143 For example,
if an employer were requiring his current or future employee to sign a morals clause provision in
their employment contract to adhere to that employer’s faith or they will be terminated, that
employee may be inclined to lie in signing that provision just to maintain or gain employment.
However, this employee will likely feel valueless that they have to lie to their employer about who
they are in order to maintain steady income or risk termination. That employee will feel especially
undervalued if their religion or culture is a large part of their personal life. Furthermore, this
employer has now officially lost out on some potentially new ideas that may come from this
employee’s different culture.
As was addressed in Part IV, minorities and women are groups of people that can be
harmed by the implementation of the DOL Regulations. Different studies have suggested that a
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promotion of fairness and equality in the workplace can lead to positive outcomes for a business,
such as low turnover144, and may also alleviate workplace conflicts such as interpersonal bias. 145
In the upcoming decades, the United States has been projected to become “minority white” which
means that minorities groups will become the majority. 146 The data shows that non-Hispanic
whites will be just under 50% of the population by the year 2045.147 This rise in the minority
population only further increases by the time we get to the year 2060.148 The increasing population
of minorities further displays that it will be imperative to have a diversified workplace in the near
future and that aspiring to such a policy now will only benefit businesses.
Recognizing the benefits of having a diversified workplace policy supports the conclusion
that the DOL Regulations should be withdrawn. While it is imperative to recognize the importance
of allowing certain entities to adhere to a religious belief in order to further their message,149 in the
for-profit sector it could be critical to not have a diversified workplace. A for-profit institution that
recognizes only way one thinking and refuses to be open-minded to other cultures loses a
competitive advantage150 and may hurt the for-profit business in achieving at least one of its main
goals - making a profit.
CONCLUSION
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The importance of autonomy granted to churches and nonprofit institutions is undoubtedly
clear and the doctrine’s protections are undeniably significant. Allowing such protections to
institutions of these types is critical to their growth because their development primarily relies on
furthering the message of their religious mission.151 The DOL Regulations seek to expand on this
doctrine by including for-profit institutions.152 This is not the case, as seen in Hobby Lobby and
through RFRA adjudication, where there must be a substantial burden proven to show that a law
or policy cannot survive strict scrutiny. 153 Nor are the DOL Regulations merely seeking to disallow
a particular type of health insurance coverage, such as, contraceptive coverage.154 As noted, the
OFCCP chose to cite Hobby Lobby as support for the DOL Regulations in the same breath that it
cited to Hosanna-Tabor.155 As made evident by this paper, Hobby Lobby was an explicitly narrow
decision only covering contraceptive coverage, 156 as opposed to giving broad religious protection
to all for-profits. Hosanna-Tabor, on the other hand, barred a minister’s employment
discrimination lawsuit protecting a church’s internal self-governance, in general.157 The DOL
Regulations propose something much closer to the Hosanna-Tabor and Amos decisions which give
for-profit institutions autonomy-based protections.158
“In short, the rule would serve as a devastating blow to religious freedom in the name of
protecting it.”159 The DOL Regulations are not a necessary implication of Hobby Lobby. Rather,
the DOL Regulations are an extension of the autonomy doctrine to for-profit institutions.
Therefore, the DOL Regulations should be withdrawn because 1. They will dilute the autonomy
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doctrine as applied to churches and nonprofits, 2. They will harm members of the LGBTQ, women,
and minority groups in the workforce, 3. This religious autonomy protection could extend to nonreligious moral claims and even larger businesses, and 4. There is value in having a diversified
workplace.
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